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Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Vol. 1. and the Staff Manual respectively Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Army Form C.2118
Unit: The Hallamshire Bn. The York & Lancaster Regiment
Month and Year: November 1944 (Erase heading not required). Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. T. Hart Dyke
Place Date Hour Summary Reference
FIELD 1   The Bn spent the day resting and refitting in ROOSENDAAL. 56 Bde made contact with the enemy on the line of R MARK, with, on their right, 104 US Div.
1   The following officers joined the Bn:- 2 Lt W.S. Tims, 2 Lt E.G. Conelly, 2 Lt E.J. Dunne.
2   At a Bde conference in the morning the Bn received orders to assist in the clearing up of the MAAS pocket. The outline plan of the operation was as follows:- OO at Appx A
2   Main effort was to be by 104 US Div, with 49 Div providing left flank protection. 104 US Div was to establish a brhd at STANDDAARBUITEN 7739, where class 40 and class 9 brs were to be built. 56 Bde were to cross at BARLAQUE 7541 by means of a kapok br, and were to use the American brs for tpt. 56 Bde would then capture KADE 7541, FIJNAART 7342 and NIEUWEMOLEN 7242. This having been done, 146 Bde with rt 1/4 KOYLI and It Hallamshires, would pass through and clear up to the bank of the MAAS. Axis of Hallamshires was to be OUDE MOLEN – ZWINGELSPAAN 7545 – TONNEKREEK 7547.
2   The ground itself was unsuited to warfare in any form. The area West of the line STAMPERSGAT 7140 – NIEUWEMOLEN – OUDE MOLEN – HELWIJK 7147 had been flooded, the rest of the ground was waterlogged and interspersed with wide, deep ditches. Movement was therefore only possible down the rds, which ran on high causeways across the fens. Because of the difficult nature of the country, it was decided that movement in the area would only be possible by night, and, furthermore, that only small bodies of tps could be employed. It was therefore decided that the Bde would remain conc at ROOSENDAAL, coy gps and minimum tpt being called fwd as reqd.
2   It was difficult to make plans at this stage of the operations, as it was not known to what extent 56 Bde would succeed, or what the real dispositions of the enemy were. The Bn was prepared to move in coy gps as outlined above from first light 3 Nov.
2   The following offrs joined the Bn:- Capt C.W. Reid, Lt A.R.H. Brown, Lt D. Simmil.
3   Both 56 Bde and 104 US Div succeeded in crossing R MARK, 2 Essex captured BARLAQUE, 2 Glos captured the factory area on the South bank of the river at STAMPERSGAT and the Americans cleared STANDDAARBUITEN. All was going well when several difficulties arose. Firstly it proved impossible to construct a kapok br, owing to the width of the river. Secondly, the class 40 br was, owing to the flat country, in full view of the enemy and under observed shellfire. A class 9 br was substituted for it, and even this was “class 9 query” at one time, having had a direct hit. 56 Bde were unable to clear more than BARLAQUE, movement towards KADE in daylight provoking a counterattack from NE, North and NW which was held with some difficulty. OO at Appx B
3   The Bn's role was consequently modified. 2 SWB were ordered to pass through 2 Essex in the late afternoon and clear towards OUDE STOOP 7744, they were also to endeavour to take KADE from the North. 1/4 KOYLI were to pass through 2 SWB when they were held up. Hallamshires role was either:- (a). If KADE had not already been captured, capture it and subsequently capture FIJNAART, or
3   (b). If KADE had been captured, capture FIJNAART, NIEUWEMOLEN and OUDE MOLEN.
3   "B" Coy was selected as leading coy, and had to consider the first part of both (a) and (b). "C" Coy was to follow. "A" Coy remained in res.
3   As night fell it was learned that 2 SWB had made some progress in their task. Before the move started it was known that KADE had fallen. The night was black as pitch, it was raining and thick cloud obscured the moon. At 2030 the Bn moved off "R" and "O" gps leading. "B" Coy debussed at STANDDAARBUITEN and marched to BARLAQUE. The CO called at 2 SWB to get the form. As far as it affected the Bn it was that patrols had contacted the enemy at KONIJNENBERG 7442.
3   The Command Post was set up at BARLAQUE and "B" Coy moved fwd to deal with the enemy. A two min conc was put down on the houses West of KADE before H hour, and was lifted 300 yds further West for another two mins. At the same time a med stonk was put down on the buildings West of KONIJNENBERG. Lt Woolerton took his pl very close behind the barrage and cleared up to 746419 without incident, the enemy having apparently fled. Two PW […] were taken, one badly wounded by shellfire. 12 Pl under Lt Simnel then passed through towards KONIJNENBERG, coming under fire from the houses about 744422. Sjt Bullock's pl was then pushed up on the left of the rd to a posn opposite the enemy. Here they were able to put down fire on the flank, while 12 Pl assaulted the buildings and took one offr and one OR prisoner.
3   This offr, when interrogated, proved very disgruntled. He said that his men were quite demoralised by the shellfire and had no automatic weapons (sic). His sentry gp had run away and he had been surprised. He said later that if his tps had only been as good as ours, there would have been a different story to tell.
3   "B" Coy continued to move on a two pl front, each pl on the embankment on either side of the rd. There was a certain amount of sniping, but no serious opposition, and three further PW were taken. The NE end of FIJNAART was reached at 0330 and the coy consolidated to allow "C" Coy to pass through, a patrol being sent to the rd junc at 733425. Pioneers moved behind the coy clearing mines.
3   "C" Coy now moved fwd, establishing a firm base with one pl at 753425. When the leading pl passed this point it was immediately engaged by LMGs on both sides of the rd. Lt Hardy took his pl round on the right and the enemy on that side withdrew. Cpl Furniss was killed outright by a burst of Schmeisser fire from a window at this stage.
3   Visibility now improved. A burning house also helped, but the pl were unable to get past the house, as the area was under fire.
3   The left hand pl moved off the rd and drove the enemy back to NIEUWEMOLEN. They were unable to get into the village, as daylight came up and they came under direct fire from an SP 88 mm, which caused three cas. During the day a patrol moved fwd and observed the village, reporting it clear. This proved to be a premature report, as was seen later that day.
3   PW: 1 offr; 6 ORs. Cas: Offrs: Wounded: Lt Kerner. ORs: Killed: One.
4   When daylight came the Bn found itself in possession of FIJNAART and the rd junc at 774425 with a command post at BARLAQUE. In this position the Bn was virtually marooned for the duration of daylight, since the whole could be observed by the enemy. Shelling of the Bn area took place during the day, but cas were light.
4   Plans now had to be made for the night’s operations. The intention was to reach the objectives originally laid down at the Bde conference. The outline plan for the night, based on the infm that NIEUWEMOLEN was clear was as follows:-
4   (a). "B" Coy was to extend to the left, taking over "C" Coy’s positions.
4   (b). "A" Coy was to capture OUDE MOLEN via X tracks 744431, sending one pl as "cut off" via X tracks 755439 to cut the rd running NE from the village. "C" Coy were then to pass through towards ZWINGELSPAAN 7545. Later "B" Coy would move on towards TONNENKREEK 7547.
4   (c). The HQ Coy rifle pl, which consisted of a recently arrived pl of converted AA gunners, were to reinforce "A" Coy at OUDE MOLEN when this was captured.
4   On the right, 1/4 KOYLI were to capture OUDE STOOF, where they had been checked in a sharp encounter earlier in the day, thence moving on to KLUNDERT 7845. In their previous encounter at OUDE STOOF 1/4 KOYLI had lost a very dear and esteemed friend of this Bn in Maj. D. Dunhil MC, who had fought as gallantly with us at VENDES.
4   During the day some enemy were found in the houses at 731415. These were cleaned up by 2 Glos, who had now forced the crossing of the river at STAMPERSGAT.
4   Shortly before the night's operations began, it was reported that the enemy were definitely in NIEUWEMOLEN, consequently a separate attack had to be mounted to clear the village. An excellent patrol led by Cpl Shaw found the enemy's posns an brought back a PW - with the aid of a blunt instrument - who declared that there were about thirty enemy in the region of the two x rds and the windmill in the village. At 2130 the village was attacked and Capt Gill took in a composite pl - his own and Lt Hardy's - and began clearing the right hand side of the village. Complete surprise was achieved. One German was killed and a number of PW were taken. The Northern side of the village was soon cleared and the pl established on the x rds to the West. Lt Conolley's pl then began on the left and cleared up the remainder of the enemy, taking 5 PW and killing one offr who was bellicose and 1 OR who tried to escape. The whole village was cleared by 0030 and patrols sent fwd, these, however, could not make much progress, as the night had now become very bright. The command post had by now been established just East of FIJNAART, Maj Newton being accidentally injured during the move.
4   In the meantime, "A" Coy were having difficulty in carrying out their task. At 2030 the coy moved out through FIJNAART, following the plan outlined above. 9 pl reached the outskirts of OUDE MOLEN before being discovered by a Boche sentry gp. They tried to rush it, but were held up by two deep dykes. They tried working round to the left, but encountered fixed line fire covering the open ground. Bren gps crawled fwd to engage the enemy posns and were standing up to their necks in water in fire posns in the ditches. Maj Nicholson gave orders for them to withdraw 200 yds, so that the village could be shelled, but Sjt. Pickavance, who was commanding the pl, reported that it would take a long time to get them out as they were heavily engaged. 7 pl was therefore sent round the NE to try to enter the village from the main rd. Moving very quietly they managed to get into the first few houses and deal with two Spandau teams. 9 pl were moved round to reinforce them, but they could not get in owing to two Spandau teams which had been by-passed by 7 pl. 7 pl then reported that it was possible to get in by by-passing the two Spandau teams. Accordingly the whole coy was moved round into the houses at the East end of the village and clearing started with one pl on each side of the rd.
4   In the meantime, 8 pl, who had been sent as the "cut-off" pl (see outline plan) had almost reached the rd, but they, again, had been held up while trying to rush the sentry gp. They had suffered hy cas and had only one NCO left, Lt Tims, the pl comd, was also wounded. Realising that they would be unable to take their objective. Maj Nicholson brought them back and used them to reinforce 9 pl.
5   When it was known that a silent attack on the rd junc at 752444 had failed, the Commanding Officer decided to send "C" Coy to attack this posn with arty sp. At the same time, the HQ Coy pl were launched up the rd NIEUWEMOLEN - OUDE MOLEN and "B" Coy extended further to the West.
5   "C" Coy set off for their objective, which was shelled for 2 mins by med and fd arty. Lt Conolley's pl then doubled straight in. Opposition was slight and the houses were quickly cleared. One PW was taken and one Boche killed without loss. The position was consolidated. The action took place at about 0430.
5   In the meantime the "HQ" Coy pl had been working steadily up the rd. The pl went along the verges as silently as possible, surprising the enemy in slit trenches, some of them asleep. Several PW were taken, two of them manning an MG, and others came out and gave themselves up. One of them volunteered the infm that an offr and 7 men were in the house at 732437. This house was surrounded by water and could only be approached along a narrow causeway 20 yds long. Not liking the idea of moving along this, the pl comd sent the prisoner into the house to tell the enemy to come out with their hands up as they were surrounded. He did this reluctantly and came back with a refusal. The pl then fired into the windows of the house, apparently wounding one of the Germans. The officer called out in English to stop firing and brought his men out. By this time 24 OR prisoners had been taken. The pl then continued along the road, searching houses. Unfortunately, some civilians in one of them made rather a lot of noise and as the pl approached the next house an MG opened up on them from about 15 yds range, wounding the batman and runner. The pl comd got back to the rest of the pl and directed MG fire on to the area but was not sure of the precise location of the MG. By the use of covering fire and still under the fire of the MG, the pl then withdrew to "B" Coy at NIEUWEMOLEN.
5   In the meantime, "A" Coy had been clearing SW and had got within 50 yds of the x-roads is OUDE MOLEN when they were held up by fixed lines and could get no further. On the right they had the road running North covered by fire and the Bren group commanded by L/Cpl. Strutt, had actually crossed the road from the NE and was at about 736443, but could not get back. The left hand pl moved into a house where it could dominate the x-roads. Coy HQ was in a house behind. In the clearing, 4 PW were taken and three others wounded or killed. Ptes Pass and Chappell worked very well killing large numbers of Germans with grenades including one spandau team. The boche were holding a large barn on the left of the road and also the houses or the x-roads. By this time the Coy was getting short of amn and had lost four Bren guns.
5   The HQ Coy Pl now came into the picture again. The Commanding Officer had ordered them to go back up the road, clear the enemy, and gain contact with "A" Coy. Whilst this was going on, "C" Coy attacked ZWINKELSPAAN with arty support. The attack was successful and the position consolidated. The HQ Coy PI carried on up the road and cleared the enemy with arty sp. They arrived on the outskirts of OUDE MOLEN just as "A" Coy were getting into trouble in that area.
5   They had observed boche having their breakfast in the area of the barn, apparently thinking "A" Coy was a patrol which had now withdrawn. The boche were sniped from alternative positions and reacted by sending forward men to find out where they were. The Coy opened fire with everything they had and the boche realized that he was practically surrounded.
5   After a while he attacked 7 Pl with Bazookas, grenades and spandaus. He worked round behind them, and realising that unless they withdrew the whole pl would probably be lost, Major Nicholson gave the order to withdraw to the East of the village. During this counter attack, every weapon, including 2" mortar and PIAT, was used against the enemy. and several were seen to be wounded, including one officer. The Coy now began to disengage to the East so that the enemy could be shelled. 7 Pl had to be got out across the
5   main road as the enemy had infiltrated into the house behind them. Lieut. Godlee arrived with a Bren, got down in the middle of the road and brought fire to bear on the boche who were covering the main road. This was the only position from which they could be engaged. Under this covering fire, his pl got out followed by Coy HQ and 9 Pl, and a position was taken up at the East end of the village. As soon as it was known that "A" Coy and the HQ Coy Pl were 300 yds from the road junction, 69 Fd Regt were asked to put down a 2 minutes intense "stonk" from the rd junc to a point 400 yds away on the rd leading North.
5   When the fire ceased the HQ Coy Pl quickly re-entered the village clearing houses and barns where there was still opposition. The Pl Comd then went forward to find "A" Coy as he had not been informed of their withdrawal by his Pl Sjt. They were not to be found but shortly afterwards a patrol reported the houses around the x-rds clear and a patrol of "A" Coy later got through and made contact.
5   During all this period the principal rds and houses were shelled and mortared, sometimes heavily. Mines were also found at 756439, at the cost of "C" Coys food truck. Amn replenishment had not been possible for "A" Coy because of the mines and the fact that the rds were under enemy observation. The Pioneers had now cleared the rds at the cost of Lieut. Hawkins wounded and Cpl. Ellis killed.
5   A Pl of "B" Coy had in the meantime been sent to 753445. The remainder of "B" Coy, with sappers to clear the rds, was now despatched via OUDE STOOF which had been captured by 1/4 KOYLI, to the same area to reinforce "A" Coy. With them they took extra Bren guns, food and amn for "A" Coy. Coy HQ and one pl eventually moved down and relieved "A" Coy. Patrols had been sent out and it was confirmed that the enemy had pulled well back towards WILLEMSTAD 7148.
5   "C" Coy were now firmly established in ZWINGELSPAAN. A patrol reported the br at 759456 clear, but civilians reported that it was mined. In the afternoon a pl occupied this br in order that 4 Lincs could adv on WILLEMSTAD. KLUNDERT had now been captured by 1/4 KOYLI and the operation, as it affected the bn, was now complete. Observation was maintained on the coast rd where retreating parties of boche were shelled. The Bn posns were shelled and mortared during the day but no further contact was made. The bn remained in its posns throughout the night having gained all its objectives, one town and four villages, in spite of all difficulties of ground, mines and darkness, and strong enemy opposition concentrated on the very restricted lines of advance.
5   Total PW 4/5 Nov. 34 ORs. Casualties. Offrs. Wounded - Lieut. Hawkins (During action 3/5 Nov). 2/Lt. Timms. O.Rs. Killed - 7. Wounded - 23. (All during action 4/5 Nov). Major P.S. Newton was injured in an accident on the night of 4 Nov.
6   The bn remained in its posns during the day and returned to ROOSENDAAL at night to rest. Major W.L. Northover joined the bn.
6   Casualties. O.Rs. Wounded - 2.
7   Bn Rest day. Lieut. D.F. Nicholson joined the bn.
8   A local hockey team was defeated in the afternoon. Trg was carried out.
9   An ENSA party was entertained at luncheon and tea. The bn carried out trg.
10   Trg was carried out.
11   A bn Adv Party moved to HAMONT 4697.
12   The day was spent in trg and adm.
13   The day was spent in trg and adm.
14   The bn moved to area BUDEL 4999. O.O. at Appx "C"
15   Conference: The plan for the attack to clear the area West of the RIVER MAAS was discussed. 1/4 KOYLI and 4 Lincs were to establish a bridgehead in the area 7402. The Hallamshires were then to pass thro’ and capture HUB 7603 - ZELEN 7604 - HEUVELHOEK 7704 - EGCHELHOEK 7703.
16   Conference: The plans were again discussed. Lieut. T.C.L. Godlee left the bn sick.
17   Adv Party moved to the wooded area on the West bank of the UIT CANAL. 51 (H) and 53 (W) Divs completed clearance of area West of MEUSE and UIT CANAL. News was received that 51 (H) Div were planning to carry out the task of 49 Div of clearing North bank of UIT CANAL from the North a bridgehead having been obtained by 5 Camerons at 724044. The Adv Party was ordered to return.
18   The bn remained at BUDEL. 51 (H) Div continued to clear SW along the axis BERINGEN – HUISHOEK – HELDEN. During the night, 1/4 KOYLI and 4 Lincs moved forward to the West bank of the UIT CANAL preparatory to taking over from 51 (H) Div in BERINGEN and HUISHOEK respectively.
19   The bn moved forward to occupy the area ZELEN 7504 – HUB 7603 – EGCHELHOEK 7703 – HEUVELHOEK 7704 which was now clear. 4 Lincs were established in the area of PANNINGEN and during the afternoon 1/4 KOYLI took up a position to their East. During the evening these bns were ordered to move forward to the area of the woods in 7806 and STOK respectively. These areas were now clear. At a Bde conference in the evening, these bns were ordered to adv Eastwards the next day towards MAASBREE 8207. The Hallamshires were to remain in reserve and move forward to area VOSBERG when they had gone forward.
20   1/4 KOYLI and 4 Lincs made slow progress and reached the line running NW and SE through 804070. They were considerably hampered by shelling coming from posns on the East bank of the MAAS. The enemy was fighting a stubborn rearguard action with parachute troops. Some of these appeared to be retiring Eastwards on the R. MAAS whilst others appeared to be making NE towards VENLO. 15 Div crossed the DEURNE CANAL and adv on the left of 49 Div. 51 Div continued to adv on the right clearing the area between 49 Div and R. MAAS. The Hallamshires were unable to move into VOSBERG area in the morning as it was congested with rear elements of 4 Lincs and numerous guns, tanks and sp arms who had all moved forward. It was late afternoon before the bn could establish itself in the new area. A posn was taken up which included LOO 7906 and VOSBERG. Bn HQ was established at the Western end of LOO.
21   The bn remained at LOO. 4 Lincs and 1/4 KOYLI were able to make little progress owing to the open ground West of MAASBREE and it was decided that a night or dawn attack would be necessary.
22   4 Lincs and 1/4 KOYLI were ordered to move forward during the night and early morning and secure MAASBREE 8207 and clear the woods in 8307 respectively. Hallamshires were then to pass through 4 Lincs and seize ROOTH 8408. DUBBROEK 8407 was to be taken by 1/4 KOYLI. The first phase was completed without difficulty and the Comd Post was est at the Eastern end of MAASBREE. A large mine crater was found at 831082 and the Pioneers cleared a diversion around it so that tanks, kangaroos and tpt could get forward. One pl or "A" Coy had been sent forward immediately behind 4 Lincs, to get into posn at 838085 before surprise was lost, with orders to patrol forward to ROOTH. A tp of tanks was moved forward into the Eastern end of MAASBREE to sp this pl. The pl go into posn and the remainder of "A" Coy was moved up behind them. A crater was found at 836805, and "A" Coy set to work to clear a diversion. In the meantime the patrol of "A" Coy had been fired on from the village of ROOTH, from the woods at 847084 and from the woods North of the rd. Posns visible on air photographs had already been plotted in these places and arty tasks prearranged on them. Arty tasks were now fired on the posns with such good effect that, as was reported later by civilians, the enemy fled from his posns. O.O. at Appx "D"
22   Preparations were now made to put into effect the original plan of seizing ROOTH with "B" Coy carried in Kangaroos. At this stage considerable confusion arose because 1/4 KOYLI staged an attack on the woods at 846084, a posn covered by our fire plan. Some delay was caused by this as the plan had to be changed. Further delay was caused when it was learned that 1/4 KOYLI were now not going to attack the woods. Once more the original plan was put into effect and "B" Coy were carried forward to ROOTH preceded by an arty bombardment, and with their right flank covered by smoke. This was done with only one mishap, when one Kangaroo took the wrong turning at ROOTH and plunged into a crater at the br at 847086 detonating a mine in the bottom. Some sprained ankles and broken noses were the outcome of this. "B" Coy now proceeded to mop up ROOTH which was, as we have already seen, now unoccupied. Within 5 minutes the Kangaroos returned to MAASBREE and ferried "C" Coy fwd to the area of the North edge of the wood and rd junc at 846086 without incident. "A" Coy now moved down the rd mopping up the houses which had been ignored by the leading Coys. "A" Coy passed through and established itself at 850092 without incident. The Comd Post now moved forward to ROOTH, followed by Bn HQ and the bn was established as planned well before dark. The enemy replied with some heavy shelling, particularly at the important rd junc at 847086. This knocked out one 15 cwt lorry killing CQMS Davies of "HQ" Coy.
22   A sec of Carriers was sent to recce to 867097. This section reported that the br at 865094 was intact, but the one at 867097 was blown. This information was later found to be inaccurate, the former br on close inspection being part damaged.
22   The days operations were highly successful on account of the efficiency of the arty preparation and the use of the Kangaroos in which our troops reached their objectives in less than five mins.
22   Casualties. O.Rs. Killed – 4. Wounded – 8.
23   The bn now proceeded with the clearance of the woods East of ROOTH. It was thought that the woods were unoccupied, but they were known to be heavily mined. The plan adopted was as follows:- Two secs and a pl comd of "B" and "C" Coys were put into Kangaroos. These were then to go up the track on the North side of the woods to 865094, where they would turn right and enter the woods. The sections were to be dropped off as standing pats in the East end of the woods and the Kangaroos were then to drive down the tracks Westwards, thus clearing Schu Mines. The pl comds would then take their Coys up the tracks thus made, laying along the tank tracks tape to show the safe way. Unfortunately this plan could not be carried out as the Carrier sec had erred in reporting the brs intact. In fact it was blown and the Kangaroos could not get into the woods. The secs got into posn however, and the pl comds walked back to collect their Coys. "B" and "C" Coys got into posn at 863093 and 864086 - the latter with OPs at the South end of the woods, without serious difficulty. The Pioneers constructed a br at 853091. "A" Coy now moved fwd down this route to 858085. Four heavily mined craters had been found along the main rd, one of which was astride the "A" Coy route. Diversion had been cleared round the Southern edge from West to East, but not, however, from North to South. "A" Coy were held up by these mines which caused casualties, and were able to advance by prodding at the rate of some 20 yds only in the space of an hour. Having passed the crater, they encountered another dense minefield, finding 60 mines ("R" and Schu) on the track in the first 100 yds. By now it was dark, and "A" Coy were withdrawn to ROOTH. The Carrier Pl was established on the br at 869094. During the night, a patrol was sent out consisting of Lieut. Brown, Lieut. Delori (attached Belgian Liaison Offr) with "A" Coy and Pioneer personnel to find a suitable OP from which BLERICK could be observed. A good OP was found at 877088 and a party consisting of two Intelligence Section, 2 Snipers and FOO, and party under Lieut. Jones. RA, was sent there. A line was laid. A dog barked when the OP party arrived and thus attracted enemy attention. The OP consequently moved back to another house some 300 yds West of the original location. As dawn broke the OP was considerably startled to see a party of 12 Germans walk through the back garden of their house and settle down in the house they themselves had originally gone to occupy. This party was stonked and 6 of them eventually moved off.
23   Casualties. O.Rs. Wounded - 5.
24   By now a bridge had been constructed at 847086 and flails were got into the wood to get "A" Coy into posn. They made triumphal progress down the track to the accompaniment of loud explosions as the mines were exploded. This unfortunately drew fire and the wools were being shelled. This shelling continued throughout the operation but "A" Coy got into posn. Mine clearance continued and further cas were caused.
24   During the day the OP did very valuable work in plotting gun posns and enemy movement. Our own arty was active.
24   During the night the bn moved forward to a dominating posn East of the woods. The Carrier Pl was withdrawn and "B" Coy occupied their posn with one pl, whilst another pl seized the houses at 871094 without incident. "A" Coy took over "C" Coy's posn, whilst "C" Coy sent a sec to protect the OP, which now moved to houses at 877088. The remainder of this pl and Coy HQ occupied the houses at 872088, whilst the second pl moved through the OP Southwards to seize the houses at 877086. All this op was carried out without incident and was completed by 0130 "according to plan".
24   Casualties. Offrs. Wounded - 2/Lt. Connolly. O.Rs. Wounded - 2.
25   As enemy patrol penetrated "C" Coy’s posn at first light, one of our men being wounded in the fighting which took place. The pat moved off. The OP gathered much useful information during the course of the day. Enemy were observed using a detour round a known minefield and many posns were plotted.
25   Preparations were made to hand over the area to 4 Lincs, who were to take over the area during the afternoon and evening. Intermittent shelling of the area took place, but it was on a reduced scale. Evidently our counter-battery methods were proving effective, or some guns had been withdrawn to other sectors. Three Dutchmen from HOUT BLERICK, one on a M/C, came into the "A" Coy posn and reported that there were no enemy in that place, but that there were eight enemy guarding a prepared demolition South of the village. He said that six of these were prepared to surrender and that they would go and fetch them. It thus being established that the HOUT BLERICK rd was clear of mines, a pat from "A" Coy entered the village. They visited the Resistance Comd Post, and no enemy were found. The Dutchmen went to round up the enemy post. The pat waited 30 mins, but as the Dutchmen did not return, they gave up and returned. In the evening, the Dutchmen returned and handed over 9 Germans to the 4 Lincs, who had by then taken over "A" Coy's posn. The relief was completed by 2000 hrs and the bn conc at LANGEHEIDEE 8409 to rest. 146 Bde was now responsible for clearance of routes and to recce the area of BLERICK for an attack to be made by 147 Bde.
25   Total PW. 9 O.Rs. Casualties. O.Rs. Wounded - 1.
25   Lieut. A.R.N. Brown left the bn sick.
26   Rest Day.
27   Rest Day.
28   The day was spent in trg on mines and weapons. Adv Party was sent to EGCHELHOEK. Major Gen. E.H. Barker CB, OBE, DSO, MC, left the Division to assume comd of 8 British Corps. Order of Day at Appx "E"
29   Bn moved to EGCHELHOEK.
30   Adv Parties were despatched to MILL and NIJMEGEN.

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Source: Jeroen Koppes, TracesOfWar.com, transcribing: Hans Houterman.

Disclaimer: This War Diary is based on its original, but typos might be corrected. Locations are calculated, so might not be in the correct place. For historical research, always check the originals.