- Second World War (1939-1945)
- SS-Untersturmführer (2nd Lieutenant)
- Kommandeur 7./SS-Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 49 “de Ruyter” / 23.SS-Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier-Division “Nederland”
- Awarded on:
- June 4th, 1944
Scholz’s Knight’s Cross recommendation reads as follows…
“On the 13.03.1944, at 00:00, the Russians launched an attack against the positions of the II./SS-Freiw.Pz.Gren.Rgt. 49 ‘De Ruyter’, which lay to the south of Lilienbach. The 6. Kompanie of the Bataillon had been fighting in uninterrupted combat since the 08.03.1944 and had already taken substantial losses. As such the Russians succeeded in breaking-in there. The enemy immediately turned towards the south and began to roll up the position of the Bataillon. The commander of the 6. Kompanie was wounded, and the Bataillon commander fell during an attempt to launch a counterattack with a few men.
SS-Untersturmführer Scholz, commander of the 7. Kompanie (located south of 6. Kompanie), noticed the battle noises and determined that the Russians must have broken-in there. In order to ascertain the situation, he went to the left wing of his Kompanie with some men. While advancing through the woods he already encountered the enemy.
Hereupon SS-Untersturmführer Scholz made the decision to take the handful of troops available to him and launch a counterattack of his own. At the head of his small unit, he smashed through the much numerically superior enemy and pushed him back through the woods in hard close combat. Through his outstanding personal bravery he inspired his men to continue forwards. In this way he succeeded in throwing the superior enemy forces from the position. After the enemy had been ejected, SS-Untersturmführer Scholz demonstrated his prudence by taking over the leadership of the 6. Kompanie in addition to his own Kompanie, which had previously fended off the Russian attack against its’ sector of the front.
Through his personal initiative, which came in tandem with an exemplary devotion to duty, SS-Untersturmführer Scholz did not only overcome a dangerous crisis caused by the death of the Bataillon commander and the penetration of strong enemy elements. By his swift response he also saw to it that the divisional reserve (which arrived in the sector of the II. Bataillon after the break-in had been cleared up) did not have to be committed. By his actions he has thereby significantly contributed to the successful holding of the Regiment’s sector while also helping to avert the disintegration of the Narwa bridgehead.”