TracesOfWar needs your help! Every euro, pound or dollar you contribute greatly supports the continuation of this website. Go to stiwot.nl and donate!

Ingram, Ritter von, Hermann (Infanterie-Reg. 309)

Date of birth:
November 3rd, 1903 (Vienna, Austria-Hungary)
Date of death:
April 22nd, 1995 (Salzburg, Austria)
Service number:
SS-Nr.: // NSDAP-Nr.:
Nationality:
German (1933-1945, Third Reich)

Biography

Complete name is Hermann Ritter von Ingram zur Liebenrain und Fragburg. His last rank was Oberleutnant der Reserve.

Promotions:
16.06.1940: Unteroffizier
00.00.1941: Leutnant d. R.
00.00.1943: Oberleutnant d. R.
19.10.1943: SS-Hauptsturmführer

Do you have more information about this person? Inform us!

DRL Sportabzeichen in Silber
Period:
Second World War (1939-1945)
Rank:
Unteroffizier (Junior Officer)
Unit:
Kompanie Truppführer, 4.(MG) Kompanie, Infanterie-Regiment 309, 208. Infanterie-Division
Awarded on:
June 16th, 1940
Awarded for:
Operation Fall Gelb
The following press article (dated 28.06.1940) describes why Ingram was awarded the Knight’s Cross…

“von Ingram was the leader of a machine-gun Zug and had previously distinguished himself through his outstanding bravery and inspiring aggressiveness during both the breakthrough of the Antwerp fortified line and the forced crossing of the Gent Canal. After successfully attacking across the Ens he and his men worked their way up to the enemy battery positions despite fierce resistance, and they captured two heavy batteries. The brave conduct of Unteroffizier von Ingram enabled the attacking infantry regiments to succeed in breaking through the entire enemy artillery position.”

von Ingram himself wrote the following first-hand account that gives a more detailed description of this event…

“Description of the breakthrough through the enemy defensive line and the enemy artillery positions in the ​​Leischoot - Ursel area:

The enemy defensive line was pushed back following the crossing over the Lys river near Stoktevyver on the 26.05.1940. The result was that, on the evening of this day, the I./I.R. 309 was able to occupy a security line along the Oostwinkel—Leischoot road between the small small of Most and the road leading westwards from Ronselestraet. It was a restless night, during which I checked the field watch twice with the commander of 4. Kompanie. Orders to attack in the direction of Ursel followed on the morning of the 27.05.1940.

I was positioned on the left wing of the Bataillon under the directive of Hauptmann Dr. Claus, commander of 4. Kompanie. This left wing was to initially attack through the forest along both sides of the road leading west from Ronselestraet. The attacking force for this advance consisted of the I. Zug of 4. Kompanie and two rifle Zügen of 3. Kompanie. Of this grouping, one rifle Zug of 3. Kompanie and a heavy machine-gun squad would advance along the left side of the road whilst the second heavy machine-gun squad would advance along the road itself. These elements of the left wing were under the leadership of the MG Zugführer Leutnant Turs, while Hauptmann Dr. Claus proceeded on the right side of the road with the second rifle Zug. The hope was that this latter Zug would be able to maintain contact with the right adjacent unit (1. Kompanie) in the low-visibility terrain. Particularly noteworthy was the fact that the left side was an open flank. A Zug of Panzerjäger was attached to the left wing in order to provide security against enemy tanks and general support.

Just before the start of the attack an enemy tank thrust to the forest edge from the west. From there it skillfully took a position between the trees and bushes, took the road under fire with its 7.5 cm gun and knocked out a heavy machine-gun with a direct hit (fortunately without losses amongst the crew). As neither Pak nor Panzerjäger were yet in position, a heavy mortar was immediately brought into position. It placed accurate fire on the enemy tank and forced it to retreat. An enemy patrol went forwards at the same time that this tank launched its sally. It was spotted, taken under fire and wiped out. 3 men were taken prisoner.

Meanwhile the preparations for the attack were completed. The Division’s Panzerjäger (commanded by an Oberleutnant) reported for duty, and the attack began. I found myself initially with 4. Kompanie’s HQ squad, near the Kompanie commander. My mission was to ensure that the left group maintained the same pace as the right group and that no-one from the rifle Zügen remained behind. We immediately received enemy rifle and machine-pistol fire, with machine-gun fire following. The first wounded men fell out. The enemy tank launched a new sally shortly after the start of the attack. It had pulled back into a side path on the left side of the forest road, and now it took the road under fire again with half of its flank protected by trees. The Zugführer of the Panzerjäger now quickly came into action. He let a gun go into position, and a few minutes later the steel colossus had burst into flames after receiving three well placed shots. The bold conduct of the Panzerjäger is particularly worthy of mention. The attack would not have come close to the success it did without their help.

The attack had been temporarily put on pause as this drama played out, but now it swing back into action. The enemy fire increased, and it was proving difficult for our men to get closer to the enemy in the very dense terrain. We were undoubtedly outnumbered and in a far worse position. At this stage of the battle, a man from 3. Kompanie reported to Hauptmann Dr. Claus that the commander of the left wing and the heavy machine-gun squad (Leutnant Turs) had been seriously wounded. I thereafter received orders to take command of the left flank and continue forwards after the order to attack.

The word of Leutnant Turs’ wounding spread quickly, and the attack on this flank initially bogged down. It must be stressed here that the difficulties of my task initially consisted of persuading the rifle squads of 3. Kompanie to advance. They were still shaken by the heavy losses incurred in the previous days by the heavy artillery shelling. Yet I managed to succeed in this task without any thought for my own person. The attack on this left wing thereafter developed very quickly. The defensive fire increased, and it was only the thinness of our ranks that resulted in only minor losses being incurred. I encountered an enemy trench system in a clear cut, and by launching a surprise attack it was possible to capture 40-50 prisoners (including a lieutenant). While following this defensive line I had to change the direction of the attack further to the left, and in the process I encountered well-built and defended enemy trench positions. The result was that the riflemen of 3. Kompanie initially wavered under this new wave of defensive fire. In this moment there existed the danger that the leftmost heavy machine-gun squad would be cut off by the enemy and taken prisoner. Such an attempt by the enemy was also clearly visible.

I was able to prevent this attempt by quickly opening fire on the enemy with a light machine-gun and thereby enable the heavy machine-guns to go into position and effectively combat the enemy positions. A heavy firefight developed. As I had no clue as to what might threaten us from our totally open left flank, I decided to launched a renewed attack under the covering fire of the heavy machine-guns despite the enemy’s clear numerical superiority. The enemy must have thought they were dealing with a much stronger attacking force, because whenever I appeared the enemy gave themselves up in increasing numbers. Along with the following riflemen of the 3. Kompanie and the heavy machine-gun squad, we managed to clear out the entire section of trenches and capture around 80 prisoners (including 2 officers). A portion of the enemy fell back in disorder. During this time I received particularly noteworthy support from the heavy machine-gun gun leader Unteroffizier Gortan and the heavy machine-gun squad leader Unteroffizier Stein, both from the 4./I.R. 309.

In the continued attack we were surprised by an encounter with a heavy artillery battery (15 cm), the crews of which either surrendered or fled. As we could still hear artillery being fired in the immediate area, I allowed the attack to continue. Further to the left we encountered another heavy battery, and although the enemy tried to fire directly on us with their cannons we managed to again either capture or rout the crews with a surprise attack. While continuing to roll up this sector, we also captured an aid station, a very large ammunition dump, the vehicle parks for the two heavy batteries and elements of a motorized infantry gun battery with two guns that continued to fire until we appeared. The total number of captured prisoners amounted to a small figure of around 120 men. A large number of enemy troops managed to escape to the rear.

During this combat the circumstances forced me to deviate strongly to the left and break contact with the right-wing group. I thus halted and went over the right wing of my sector in order to personally make contact with the commander of our entire grouping, Hauptmann Dr. Claus, after I had vainly tried to reach him via messenger. Going back to the right, I encountered Hauptmann Dr. Claus near the crossroads north of Veldstraet. Here I learned that he himself had lost contact with the right wing, meaning that the Bataillon’s entire left wing was isolated. In light of the importance of our position, I received orders to personally go to the Bataillon command post in order to report on the situation and request reinforcements. I found the Bataillon command post in a homestead to the northwest of the village of Veldstraet itself. There I received the order ‘left wing must stay as is, further orders will follow.’

In the meantime the Panzerjäger (which had been pulled back after successfully combating the enemy armour) were brought forwards again along with a portion of the Division’s bicycle Schwadron. Hauptmann Dr. Claus thus decided to continue the attack along the Veldstraet—Berken road and against the village of Veldstraet itself with two heavy machine-guns and the aforementioned weapons.

I came back with the orders from the Bataillon at a time when the attack had again come into motion and already captured the first homesteads of Veldstraet. Before I returned to the left sector I executed an attack to the right of the road with 2 messengers from 4. Kompanie’s HQ squad and a rifle squad from 3. Kompanie. While doing so we captured another enemy battery with all its assorted baggage (munitions dump, limbers, supplies and horses) as well as another 70-80 prisoners, including 2 officers. During this attack against the village the Panzerjäger Zug again distinguished itself in an outstanding way. It repulsed the sally of an enemy tank that had come to Veldstraet from the direction of Berken. It also providing valuable help during the attack against the houses by delivering accurate shots against enemy resistance nests.

Hauptmann Dr. Claus ordered the attack to halt after it had reached the crossroads leading towards Roose-Ursel so that he could personally report to the Bataillon commander on the combat situation. For the time being he transferred overall command to the Oberleutnant of the Panzerjäger. Meanwhile I took over command of the infantry security elements created from the heavy machine-gun squad and the rifle squads of 3. Kompanie.

Hauptmann Dr. Claus encountered the regimental commander while on his way to the Bataillon command post. The new orders were that the attack would initially be continued in the direction of Berken. However, even as this was in the process of being carried out, the orders were changed and our unit was relieved by the II./I.R. 309. I. Bataillon was to instead continue marching through Ursel and towards Vinkweyk. The capitulation of the Belgian army took place on the following day (28.05.1940).

A review of this combat day illuminates how difficult it is for the higher commands to get a clear view of the actual situation in such confusing terrain. It was even harder for me to know which enemy forces I had to engage given the fact that my left flank was completely open. As such I had no idea that I and my laughably minor force would succeed in capturing the following enemy materiel, which amounted to:

- 2 motorized batteries
- A large ammunition dump
- An aid station
- The vehicle park of the motorized batteries
- Elements of a motorized infantry gun company
- A battery of field howitzers with their limbers, supplies and horses
- A total of about 350-400 prisoners.

Equally noteworthy was that we simultaneously broke through the enemy defensive lines and artillery positions with the minor forces at hand.”
Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes

Sources

  • Photo 1: Known to STIWOT
  • - Fellgiebel W.P., Elite of the Third Reich, The recipients of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross 1939-1945: A Reference, Helion & Company Limited, Solihull, 2003, ISBN 1-874622-46-9
    - Ritterkreuz Archiv II/2009, Veit Scherzer, Ranis, Juni 2009, ISSN 1866-4709
    - Die Träger des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939-1945
    - Salzburger Volksblatt, Edition 150, Page 5.

Photo