Radowitz, von, Joseph "Josef"
- Date of birth:
- July 29th, 1899 (Frankfurt am Main/Hessen-Nassau, Germany)
- Date of death:
- June 1st, 1956 (Bad Wiessee/Bavaria, Germany)
- Nationality:
- German (1933-1945, Third Reich)
Biography
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Deutsches Kreuz in Gold
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Oberst (Colonel)
- Unit:
- Panzergrenadier-Regiment 28, 8. Panzer-Division, Heer
- Awarded on:
- February 29th, 1944
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Oberst (Colonel)
- Unit:
- Führer, 23. Panzer-Division, Heer
- Awarded on:
- September 17th, 1944
1) Near Sandomierz around Krosno-Blizne (29.07.-01.08.1944).
2) In the offensive and defensive fighting north of and around Mielec (02.-13.08.).
3) During the Division’s operations on the north side of the Soviet Sandomierz-Baranow bridgehead (19.08.-02.09.1944).
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Generalleutnant (Major-general)
- Unit:
- Kommandeur 23. Panzer-Division, Heer
- Awarded on:
- May 9th, 1945
Radowitz’s Oakleaves’ recommendation reads as follows…
“During 10 days of bitter fighting it was the 23. Panzer-Division under the leadership of Generalleutnant von Radowitz that repeatedly succeeded in bringing far superior enemy forces to a halt and thereby preventing their breakthrough. Although crises emerged one after the other, and although other formations fled the field (at times without leaders and/or in total disintegration), there was never a moment where the highly respected commander of this Division let go of his unit’s reins. Allowing no respite for himself, he repeatedly placed himself in the foremost line in order to gain a proper grasp of the situation. The Armee commander himself attested to the Division’s steadfastness during his visit to the unit on the 23.03.1945, and it was this quality that enabled the Division to decisively influence the fate of 6. Armee in the time period 21.-28.03.1945.
Later on, after conducting gruelling and difficult withdrawal movements, the Division was assigned the task of striking into the deep southern flank of enemy forces advancing westwards. The attack, which began on the 02.04.1945, had the goal of blocking the important road Nova—Lenti. The assault was prosecuted with great energy, and thanks to the divisional commander’s active leadership in the foremost line it led to a total success. Despite strong enemy counterattacks, the road Nova—Lenti remained blocked the entire day. It was only in accordance with orders from above that the Division pulled back to the line Csömöder—Mumor—Lentikapolna during the following night.
The planned occupation of the new frontline went along smoothly in the right divisional sector, but on the left our forces had to wrest control of it from enemy forces that had advanced through the Mumor—Lentikapolna forest. At dawn on the 03.04.1945 the enemy began launching strong attacks that were concentrated in the sector Lenti—Szombathely—Mumor. Enemy reinforcements arrived, and hostile attacks eventually struck all along the Division’s sector over the course of the morning. Deep penetrations were consequently achieved, particularly in the Lenti—Szombathely sector.
In this already very critical situation, the Division received a message at around 12:00 from the rightly adjacent SS-Pz.Div. The neighbouring Division reported that it had lost friendly contact on the right and that, apparently, no more German troops were offering up resistance on either side of the road atop the northern bank of the Mura river. This meant that, with no resistance being present on the road, the enemy had a clear path to the Alsolendvar gap and the river crossing over the Mura river that was located there. This was the only such crossing available to all German formations north of the river, and its control by the enemy would’ve created ideal conditions for the annihilation of these units. The situation was made even worse by the fact that all available reserves had already been dispatched to eliminate existing penetrations at the frontline.
Thus, in spite of the danger it would create for his own frontline, the divisional commander decided to plunder a force of Jagdpanzers, SPWs and a Pionier-Kompanie from his own sector and use them to block the road fork east of Dobri. He also assembled all the other still available weak forces, halted vehicles that were driving back along the road and used them to transport his troops to the newly threatened area.
The reconnaissance units that were dispatched ahead reported in at 13:00, stating that the enemy had already occupied the commanding Hill 234. Even more concerning was the revelation that 7 enemy tanks with mounted infantry were already attacking Dobri itself. With this the enemy was already deep in the rear of those friendly Divisionen fighting towards the north and northeast of the bridgehead.
In this extremely precarious situation there was neither telephone or radio contact with the Kav.-Korps. But it was crucial to prevent the destruction of all the friendly divisions fighting north of the Mura river. Thusly, after consultation with the commander of the 9. SS-Panzer-Division, Generalleutnant von Radowitz made the independent decision to immediately pull back the front of both Divisionen to the line Tornyszentmiklos—Lovasy—Szobalakos. Using the forces freed up by this move, it would then be possible to commence an attack towards the south against the enemy troops in the Dobri gap.
With the enemy in hot pursuit, the extremely difficult withdrawal movement was carried out. As always, the divisional commander was present at the hotspots of the fighting during this time. His presence with the regiments gave him clear insight into both local situations as well as the bigger picture of events. In this way, and although this extremely difficult withdrawal operation was being conducted by day, he kept losses within reasonable limits and was able to use the freed up troops to intercept the enemy as they entered into Tornyszentmiklos. This in turn permitted an orderly withdrawal of both the Divisionen of the Kav.-Korps as well as those scattered elements of the XXII. Gebirgs-Armee-Korps that were located in the mountains northwest of Letenye.
The bold initiative and magnificent leadership of Generalleutnant von Radowitz was the primary factor that thwarted the enemy’s aim of eliminating all 8 friendly Divisionen on the northern side of the Mura river. On the 06.04.1945 the last friendly forces evacuated the bridgehead under the protection of the 23. Panzer-Division. This Division was then rushed over to Radkersburg in order to halt the Russian forces that were striking towards the home territories of the Reich.”
His nomination for the Oak Leaves was received by the Heerespersonalamt (HPA—Army Staff Office) from the troop on 30-4-1945 and approved by all intermittent commanding officers. Major Joachim Domaschk ruled that the nomination was insufficient and disapproved on 1 May and recommended "Decision by Chief of OKW". The file contains no indication whether this decision was ever taken. A teleprinter message was sent on 2 May to the nominating unit, the cavalry corps, and further messages to the commanding officers of the Panzer AOK 2 and Heeresgruppe Süd: "...was disapproved because ... the Führer criteria for the presentation guidelines have not been met. I.A. signed Maisel" The sequential number "882" was assigned by the Association of Knight's Cross Recipients (OdR), the presentation date by Fellgiebel.
“During 10 days of bitter fighting it was the 23. Panzer-Division under the leadership of Generalleutnant von Radowitz that repeatedly succeeded in bringing far superior enemy forces to a halt and thereby preventing their breakthrough. Although crises emerged one after the other, and although other formations fled the field (at times without leaders and/or in total disintegration), there was never a moment where the highly respected commander of this Division let go of his unit’s reins. Allowing no respite for himself, he repeatedly placed himself in the foremost line in order to gain a proper grasp of the situation. The Armee commander himself attested to the Division’s steadfastness during his visit to the unit on the 23.03.1945, and it was this quality that enabled the Division to decisively influence the fate of 6. Armee in the time period 21.-28.03.1945.
Later on, after conducting gruelling and difficult withdrawal movements, the Division was assigned the task of striking into the deep southern flank of enemy forces advancing westwards. The attack, which began on the 02.04.1945, had the goal of blocking the important road Nova—Lenti. The assault was prosecuted with great energy, and thanks to the divisional commander’s active leadership in the foremost line it led to a total success. Despite strong enemy counterattacks, the road Nova—Lenti remained blocked the entire day. It was only in accordance with orders from above that the Division pulled back to the line Csömöder—Mumor—Lentikapolna during the following night.
The planned occupation of the new frontline went along smoothly in the right divisional sector, but on the left our forces had to wrest control of it from enemy forces that had advanced through the Mumor—Lentikapolna forest. At dawn on the 03.04.1945 the enemy began launching strong attacks that were concentrated in the sector Lenti—Szombathely—Mumor. Enemy reinforcements arrived, and hostile attacks eventually struck all along the Division’s sector over the course of the morning. Deep penetrations were consequently achieved, particularly in the Lenti—Szombathely sector.
In this already very critical situation, the Division received a message at around 12:00 from the rightly adjacent SS-Pz.Div. The neighbouring Division reported that it had lost friendly contact on the right and that, apparently, no more German troops were offering up resistance on either side of the road atop the northern bank of the Mura river. This meant that, with no resistance being present on the road, the enemy had a clear path to the Alsolendvar gap and the river crossing over the Mura river that was located there. This was the only such crossing available to all German formations north of the river, and its control by the enemy would’ve created ideal conditions for the annihilation of these units. The situation was made even worse by the fact that all available reserves had already been dispatched to eliminate existing penetrations at the frontline.
Thus, in spite of the danger it would create for his own frontline, the divisional commander decided to plunder a force of Jagdpanzers, SPWs and a Pionier-Kompanie from his own sector and use them to block the road fork east of Dobri. He also assembled all the other still available weak forces, halted vehicles that were driving back along the road and used them to transport his troops to the newly threatened area.
The reconnaissance units that were dispatched ahead reported in at 13:00, stating that the enemy had already occupied the commanding Hill 234. Even more concerning was the revelation that 7 enemy tanks with mounted infantry were already attacking Dobri itself. With this the enemy was already deep in the rear of those friendly Divisionen fighting towards the north and northeast of the bridgehead.
In this extremely precarious situation there was neither telephone or radio contact with the Kav.-Korps. But it was crucial to prevent the destruction of all the friendly divisions fighting north of the Mura river. Thusly, after consultation with the commander of the 9. SS-Panzer-Division, Generalleutnant von Radowitz made the independent decision to immediately pull back the front of both Divisionen to the line Tornyszentmiklos—Lovasy—Szobalakos. Using the forces freed up by this move, it would then be possible to commence an attack towards the south against the enemy troops in the Dobri gap.
With the enemy in hot pursuit, the extremely difficult withdrawal movement was carried out. As always, the divisional commander was present at the hotspots of the fighting during this time. His presence with the regiments gave him clear insight into both local situations as well as the bigger picture of events. In this way, and although this extremely difficult withdrawal operation was being conducted by day, he kept losses within reasonable limits and was able to use the freed up troops to intercept the enemy as they entered into Tornyszentmiklos. This in turn permitted an orderly withdrawal of both the Divisionen of the Kav.-Korps as well as those scattered elements of the XXII. Gebirgs-Armee-Korps that were located in the mountains northwest of Letenye.
The bold initiative and magnificent leadership of Generalleutnant von Radowitz was the primary factor that thwarted the enemy’s aim of eliminating all 8 friendly Divisionen on the northern side of the Mura river. On the 06.04.1945 the last friendly forces evacuated the bridgehead under the protection of the 23. Panzer-Division. This Division was then rushed over to Radkersburg in order to halt the Russian forces that were striking towards the home territories of the Reich.”
His nomination for the Oak Leaves was received by the Heerespersonalamt (HPA—Army Staff Office) from the troop on 30-4-1945 and approved by all intermittent commanding officers. Major Joachim Domaschk ruled that the nomination was insufficient and disapproved on 1 May and recommended "Decision by Chief of OKW". The file contains no indication whether this decision was ever taken. A teleprinter message was sent on 2 May to the nominating unit, the cavalry corps, and further messages to the commanding officers of the Panzer AOK 2 and Heeresgruppe Süd: "...was disapproved because ... the Führer criteria for the presentation guidelines have not been met. I.A. signed Maisel" The sequential number "882" was assigned by the Association of Knight's Cross Recipients (OdR), the presentation date by Fellgiebel.
Eisernes Kreuz 2.Klasse (1914)
- Period:
- First World War (1914-1918)
- Awarded on:
- 1917
- Period:
- First World War (1914-1918)
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Awarded on:
- October 6th, 1939
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Awarded on:
- June 26th, 1940
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Awarded on:
- August 8th, 1942
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Awarded on:
- October 4th, 1944
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Awarded on:
- October 19th, 1943
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Awarded on:
- August 21st, 1944
Sources
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